By Prof Moyo Okediji
The pursuit of security in Nigeria remains challenging, but the country is fighting harder than before to secure its territory.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu inherited a country riddled with banditry, abductions, and violence.
Some critics blame him by arguing that his party, the APC, played a prominent role in enabling the entry of bandits into Nigeria and positioning them strategically as a means of exercising political control.
Others point out that, under his administration, numerous cases of abduction have continued to occur, particularly in northern Nigeria.
Still others insist that Tinubu is not doing enough to curtail banditry in parts of northern Nigeria, where armed groups have taken control of territories, imposed protection levies on residents, and virtually established parallel systems of authority.
Yet there is some cause for optimism.
Tinubu appears to understand that banditry and abduction can be curtailed where local communities are not themselves deeply implicated in the operations and where members of the ruling class neither cultivate nor profit from insecurity.
His administration also appears increasingly willing to confront banditry in places where there is sufficient political and communal support for doing so.
This brings us to the complicated relationship between national politics, regional interests, and presidential elections in Nigeria.
It is extremely difficult for a southerner to win a nationwide presidential election without substantial support from the North.
This is a challenge that supporters of Peter Obi must confront: a candidate may perform extraordinarily well throughout the South and still be unable to become president without sufficient electoral support across northern Nigeria and the Southwest.
Any first-term president seeking reelection must therefore understand the limitations imposed by Nigeria’s regional political structure.
A southern president who wants to win a national election—however brilliant or well-intentioned—must negotiate carefully with the interests of regional populations and their political elites.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo learned this lesson the hard way when he lost the 1983 presidential election to Alhaji Shehu Shagari.
Awolowo encountered particularly hostile opposition while campaigning in parts of eastern Nigeria.
On some occasions, political opponents disrupted his appearances and reportedly stoned his entourage.
His political difficulties in the region were compounded by controversial policy positions, including his proposal to ban the importation of stockfish—popularly known as okporoko—which he regarded as an unnecessary expenditure of scarce foreign currency.
In the North, Awolowo faced a different political challenge.
His commitment to extending formal education to children within the almajiri system did not produce the same kind of violent reception he experienced in parts of the East.
Nevertheless, he was unable to secure the level of northern electoral support necessary to win the presidency.
Awolowo’s inability to convert his national political vision into sufficient regional electoral support contributed to Shagari’s victory in 1983 and, in my view, to the subsequent political trajectory that helped push Nigeria toward its present difficulties.
Tinubu, a wily politician, understands these realities.
He knows that he cannot afford to rock the political boat in the North.
He also understands the complicated relationships among insecurity, local political interests, religious authority, and economic power.
Allegations have repeatedly been made that influential individuals benefit politically or economically from banditry and terrorism in the north.
Such allegations should, of course, be established with evidence rather than assumed to be true.
Tinubu therefore faces a difficult political calculation: how aggressively can he confront entrenched interests while preserving the political alliances and freedom of movement necessary for his reelection campaign in 2027?
He faces another complicated political landscape in the Southeast, where insecurity, separatist agitation, political interests, and economic pressures have become intertwined.
The recurring Monday shutdown of markets in parts of the region illustrates the difficulty of establishing normal civic and economic life through governmental authority alone.
Tinubu might attempt to compel businesses to remain open on Mondays, but aggressive federal intervention could produce political consequences of its own.
He must therefore balance security enforcement against his need to retain political access to the region.
The Southwest presents a different situation.
Here, banditry and terrorism are generally regarded as threats to regional stability rather than acceptable instruments of political organization.
Both the political establishment and ordinary citizens have strong incentives to resist the expansion of kidnapping, armed occupation, and related forms of insecurity.
This is where Tinubu potentially becomes an important political asset to the Southwest: his administration has a strong incentive to ensure that a reasonable measure of security is maintained throughout the region.
The question is whether his government has developed an effective strategy against kidnapping and banditry in the Southwest.
Security agencies must be able to respond rapidly and intelligently to asymmetric threats while remaining within the law and protecting the rights of innocent people.
And this raises the larger political question:
If Tinubu were to lose reelection in 2027, what would happen to security in the Southwest?
Would the region become increasingly vulnerable to armed groups crossing into its forests and rural communities?
Would kidnapping expand?
Would women, children, farmers, travelers, and other vulnerable citizens once again become bargaining tokens in a criminal economy based on ransom?
These are important questions.
For many voters in the Southwest, therefore, the 2027 election may ultimately involve more than party loyalty or ethnic solidarity.
It may become a referendum on security itself.
Yes, commodities are still expensive, and the cost of living remains high.
Yet, Tinubu’s reported use of asymmetrical warfare for combating insecurity is significant.
News report indicated that his security officers arrested the abductors’ family members and used them as bargaining chips leading to the return of those kidnapped in Oyo north.
This achievement remains fresh in the memory of voters in the southwest.
If voters conclude that Tinubu’s presidency provides the region with greater protection against kidnapping, banditry, and territorial encroachment, that perception could become one of the strongest incentives for the Southwest to support his reelection.
